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Abstract: The present study sheds light on the comparative experiences of the two 
countries originating from differing legal systems and describes how their codes and 
practices affect the publicly listed firms’ performance. It investigates the linkages 
between Research and Development (R&D) expenditures, Board characteristics 
and firm performance using a sample of Irish and Spanish firms for the period 
2005–2014. To do this, the study uses ROA and Tobin’s Q as proxies for financial 
performance; and board size, non-executive directors, female representation and 
CEO duality as board structure characteristics; and R&D expenditure volatility, 
employing different techniques that include OLS, fixed effects model and Quantile 
regression model. The difference-in-difference model is used to verify the 
significance of robustness of relationships considering the global financial crisis as 
an exogenous shock. The descriptive statistics suggests a comparability of boards’ 
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independence for the Spanish- and Irish-listed firms. Although the Spanish firms are 
less dual than Irish firms, the results are comparable on the association between 
CEO duality and firm performance. The findings of Spanish-listed firms on the 
relationship between increase and decrease in the R&D expenditures volatility and 
performance support the creative–destructive perspective that suggests effective 
governance in funding allocation to R&D.
Subjects: Economics and Development; Risk Management; Corporate Finance; Investment 
& Securities; Risk Management; Corporate Governance
Keywords: research and development volatility; boards; corporate governance; creative  
–destructive perspective; Spanish- and Irish-listed firms; difference-in-difference model
JEL classification: G.30; G.32; G.34; N.24
1. Introduction
This study investigates the effects of R&D expenditure and corporate governance, using board char-
acteristics, on the performance of publicly listed firms in Ireland and Spain. In a competitive environ-
ment and times of uncertainty, many companies consider investments in R&D as a crucial strategy 
for increasing firm value, market share (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2005; Lev & Sougiannis, 1996; 
Pakes, 1985) and developing sustainable competitive advantages (Kor & Mahoney, 2005). These 
decisions involve a certain degree of risk (David, Hitt, & Gimeno, 2001) and the role of corporate 
boards is crucial in influencing such decisions. The present study therefore, considers the role of 
corporate governance and the effects of the investment decisions on the performance of publicly 
listed firms in Spain and Ireland. It also examines if the experiences and results during the financial 
crisis period differ from non-financial crisis period.
The governance mechanisms operate differently in crisis and non-crisis periods (van Essen, 
Engelen, & Carney, 2013). The tendency to respond to a crisis with more stringent rules might be 
counterproductive since such measures may compromise executives’ ability to respond appropri-
ately to shocks. During a crisis, practitioners are encouraged to optimise rather than maximise their 
governance choices (van Essen et al., 2013). This might also have implications on the performance 
of the firm. This study separates firm performance during and after the financial crisis to highlight 
this governance issue as well.
The 2007–2008 financial crisis has been identified as the world’s deepest since the Great 
Depression of the last century (Gregoriou, 2009). The origins of this crisis were initially attributed to 
governance failures in the financial sector. The collapse of the US real-estate market and the subse-
quent failure to offload sub-prime risks ultimately resulted in a credit crisis (Gregoriou, 2009). Others 
implicate the use of novel and poorly understood financial instruments such as collateralised debt 
obligations. The use of high-powered incentive compensation for senior banking executives may 
have exacerbated the problem. In this view, boards of directors were believed to be inadequate in 
monitoring executives and evaluating the risks they assumed (Muller-Kahle & Lewellyn, 2011).
1.1. Corporate governance codes in Ireland and Spain
From the legal origin point of view, Irish corporate governance codes originate from common law 
jurisdiction while Spain belongs to civil law jurisdiction. Their codes on gender diversity, board size, 
duality and non-executive directors’ (NED) composition vary. In Spain, the Unified code is the current 
version of the Spanish corporate governance code. This code harmonises and reviews the recom-
mendations and principles stated by both the Olivencia and the Aldama Committees (Paredes & 
Núñez-Lagos, 2015).
In Ireland, companies listed on the main securities market are required to comply with both the 
UK corporate governance code (the corporate governance code) and the Irish corporate governance 
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annex. An important basis or feature of the corporate governance code is the “comply or explain” 
approach. Under this approach, the company has to either comply with the regulation or explain as 
to why it is unable to comply with the regulation. The role of the director is governed principally by 
the Irish Companies Acts, which is the primary source of corporate law in Ireland, and also by prin-
ciples established by case law (in this regard, it is worth noting that English case law is regarded as 
having persuasive authority in Ireland). This body of law is further supplemented by a growing suite 
of regulations, codes and guidelines (Whit, 2014).
With regards to the board structure, the Spanish legislation (namely the Companies Law 2010) 
provides for a standard one-tier board structure for public companies, as mandatory for all listed 
companies (with an exception to European companies incorporated in Spain). For Ireland, although, 
the Irish law does not prohibit the two-tier board structure, in general, the board of directors of Irish 
companies are structured as a one-tier body (usually comprising of both executive and NED). 
Moreover, the code of corporate governance in Spain stipulates a board size of between 5 and 15 
members and it is the only country in Europe to mandate a board size, while, the Irish company code 
suggests a minimum of at least two directors on the boards and no upper limit. Neither Spain nor 
Ireland has formulated a standard rule on CEO duality (Paredes & Núñez-Lagos, 2015).
Corporate governance codes play an increasingly important role in addressing gender balance on 
corporate boards. Notably, regarding female board representation, Spain has a quota system in 
place. In 2007, Spain adopted a law on effective equality between women and men, which recom-
mends to large companies with more than 250 employees and to companies listed on IBEX 35 to 
gradually appoint women on their boards until an even number of male and female members has 
been achieved (Whit, 2014). These companies were required, within eight years, to gradually modify 
the composition of their boards until a proportion of between 40 and 60% of each gender has been 
reached. For Ireland, no quota law or proposal for private companies is underway on gender diver-
sity. However, on average, the women representation on boards of Spanish corporates is around 
10% while for Ireland it is at 8% (Rodriguez-Ferández, 2015).
In the case of Spain, the Code suggests a balance between external and internal directors. External 
directors can be of two different types: proprietary (those representing controlling shareholders) and 
independent (those with no links with the company, its managers or controlling shareholders). 
Under the Code, while the proprietary members should represent the significant shareholders in a 
proportion that matches the capital they represent, the number of independent directors should be 
at least one-third of all board members. However, Irish law does not make any distinction between 
the executive and NED.
According to La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), countries with legal rules 
originating in the common law tradition (Australia, Canada, US, the UK) protect investors significantly 
more than the countries whose laws originate in French civil law (Argentina, Belgium, France, Italy, 
Poland and Spain) (Inkpen & Ramaswamy, 2005). It is noteworthy, to examine how the two legal 
jurisdictions will affect the corporate governance codes and their effects on firms’ performances and 
earnings volatility.
This paper contributes to the literature in many ways. First, it sheds light on the comparative ex-
periences of the two countries originating from differing legal system and describes how their codes 
and practices affect the publicly listed firms’ performance. Second, it empirically tests existing theo-
ries relating to board characteristics and R&D expenditure volatility to firm performance. This is done 
in the context of Spain and Ireland, which was impacted by the financial crisis. This offers a natural 
experiment to test financial crisis as an exogenous shock. This enables better understanding of how 
board characteristics and R&D volatility can affect firm performance in different contexts, such as 
cultural differences across countries which may affect the significance or even the direction of the 
relationship, the effective governance in funding allocation and lastly, it shows the effectiveness and 
relevance of the newly introduced code on female representation in Spain to the firm performance. 
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By doing so, it compares with Irish firms’ experiences and underscores the relevance of the individ-
ual institutional settings of the countries.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the review of literature, Section 3 
describes data sources and methodology, Section 4 presents the empirical findings and Section 5 
presents discussion and conclusions.
2. Literature review
This research considers three theories: resource dependency theory and agency theory, to explain 
the effects of board characteristics (female representation, NED, board size and CEO duality) on firm 
performance.
A general and popular view in the literature is that the board size is negatively related to 
performance for firms regardless of the firm size. For instance, studies that show a negative board 
size effect on performance of firms outside US include: Conyon and Peck (1998) who analyse firms in 
the UK, France, the Netherlands, Denmark and Italy; Mak and Kusnadi (2005) who analyse firms in 
Malaysia and Singapore; Loderer and Peyer (2002) who analyse firms in Switzerland; and de Andres, 
Azofra, and Lopez (2005) who analyse firms in 10 OECD countries. In contrast, Jong, DeJong, Mertens, 
and Wasley (2000) and Black, Jang, and Kim (2006) report non-significant effects of board size on 
performance in Dutch and Korean firms, respectively. Kiel and Nicholson (2003) find positive board 
size effects in Australia. Thus, with few exceptions, the negative board size effect is well established 
for large publicly held corporations across countries. Further, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) 
conclude that: “The data therefore appear to reveal a fairly clear picture: board size and firm value 
are negatively correlated”. This is in contrast to the theoretical literature (resource dependency and 
agency perspective on boards), which holds that a negative board size effect should only apply to 
firms with a relatively large number of directors: From the perspective of the resource dependency 
theory, the board members are the nexus between the company and the resources it needs to 
maximise value (Pfeffer, 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This theory suggests a positive association 
between the board size and performance (Barroso Castro, Villegas Perińan, & Perez-Calero, 2010). 
On the other hand, the agency theory (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) 
supports any mechanisms that solve the conflict between managers and owners. Given that the 
board of directors is seen as a good tool to align their respective competing interests, it can be 
assumed that the larger boards can exercise better control on managers than those with smaller 
number (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984).
Hypothesis 1: Board size will have a positive effect on firm performance.
Agency theory argues that separating the roles of CEO and chairman of the board can mitigate 
agency costs (Chen, Cheung, Stouraitis, & Wong, 2005; Jermias, 2007). As a leader of the board, the 
chairman is responsible for monitoring the CEO’s decision-making and overseeing the process of 
CEO hiring, firing, evaluation and compensation. The combination of two leadership roles would 
constrain the chairman from taking on an effective and objective monitoring role, thus promoting 
CEO entrenchment and intensifying agency conflicts. Beasley, Carcello, and Hermanson (1999) find 
that CEO duality was involved in 72% of the frauds examined by the SEC. Hence, we consider duality 
as a key driver of agency conflicts due to reduced monitoring and allowing the CEO to act in his or 
her own interests. Further evidence about the potential problems associated with duality is found in 
relation to corporate decline, where duality is frequently cited as an important factor that influences 
the downward spiral of companies. Daily and Dalton (1994) find that duality is more common in 
failed firms than in non-failed firms.
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Hypothesis 2: Duality will have a positive effect on firm performance.
Notwithstanding the value of vigilant board oversight, the managerial discretion literature suggests 
that overzealous monitoring and frequent interference in a firm’s affairs may discourage managerial 
initiatives (Burkart, Gromb, & Panunzi, 1997). In a large body of work, Finkelstein and his colleagues 
(Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990) find that powerful CEOs, for example, 
those with dual role, tend to have a beneficial effect on firm performance in uncertain environments 
where, encumbered by fewer constraints, they can make quick decisions without the need to build 
consensus. In these contexts, CEO duality allows a single unified voice to guide a firm during a crisis 
as there is little ambiguity regarding who is incharge.
Hypothesis 3: Duality will have a negative effect on firm performance during the crisis.
Similarly, NED are believed to be more vigilant monitors of firm management, but Williamson (2007) 
contends that NED have an information disadvantage compared with insiders and are typically slow 
to react in situations of adversity. Williamson warns that boards comprising of a high ratio of NED 
typically “failed to act promptly and with urgency when a crisis occurs” (2007, p. 262). Accordingly, 
following van Essen et al. (2013) this study reasons that while good governance board characteris-
tics associated with vigilant oversight may represent best practice in stable state conditions, these 
same characteristics can inhibit managerial discretion and limit their capacity to respond to the 
contingencies of a financial crisis with negative effects for a firm’s financial performance.
Hypothesis 4: A high fraction of independent directors, will have a more negative impact on 
a firm’s financial performance during financial.
Hypothesis 5: A high fraction of independent directors, will have a positive impact on a firm’s 
financial performance during non-financial crisis period.
Prior research suggests that, as per R&D manipulation hypothesis, managers routinely manipulate 
R&D expenditures to smooth earnings or to meet earnings forecasts (Degeorge, Patel, & Zeckhauser, 
1999). For instance, Baber, Fairfield, and Haggard (1991) argue that managers reduce R&D expendi-
tures when earnings will be less than analysts’ forecasts. Generally, managers are thought to make 
myopic decisions regarding R&D investments, focusing on short-term earnings instead of concen-
trating on value creation (Cheng, 2004). Firms that interrupt R&D investment have less knowledge 
and a diminished ability to learn (Kor & Mahoney, 2005). Such firms making frequent and substantial 
changes in R&D spending may sacrifice long-term R&D performance in favour of short-term earn-
ings’ predictability (Baber et al., 1991; Bushee, 1998; Cheng, 2004; Dechow & Sloan, 1991; Degeorge 
et al., 1999; Elliott, Richardson, Dyckman, & Dukes, 1984; Perry & Grinaker, 1994). These occurrences 
lead to R&D volatility.
Hypothesis 6: If research and development volatility stems from earnings management 
activity, then we expect a negative effect of research and development expenditures 
volatility on firm performance.
In contrast, the creative–destructive perspective suggests that if fluctuations in R&D are due to 
effective governance of the funding allocation to R&D process, then it can be valuable, since it frees 
up firm resources that may be redeployed in future search activities (Schumpeter, 1942; Swift, 2008). 
From the frame of “essential fact about capitalism” coined by Joseph Schumpeter (1942), creative 
destruction refers to the incessant product and process innovation mechanism in which new 
production units replace outdated ones (Schumpeter, 1942). Accordingly, the study investigates the 
relation between R&D volatility and firm performance.
Hypothesis 7: Firm performance is positively related to changes in research and development 
expenditure.
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3. Data source and methodology
This study investigates the relationships between corporate governance and firm financial perfor-
mance of listed firms in Ireland and Spain. We have selected 21 firms listed on Irish stock exchange 
Index, ISEQ20 and the 52 major companies in Spanish stock market, including all the companies 
listed on index IBEX35, for the period 2005–2014. The firm-year observations that did not have 
three-year continuous data were eliminated to reduce errors. The final panel data are strongly bal-
anced for the two countries. Company performance data and other accounting data for explanatory 
variables were downloaded from Thomson One Banker (Worldscope database). Data on board struc-
ture determinants were hand collected from the annual reports of each observed company and all 
the annual reports were downloaded from companies’ official website.
The study uses R&D expenditure volatility as empirical proxy to capture the intensity of the pro-
cess of creative destruction in the funding reallocation decisions. The magnitude of R&D expenditure 
volatility is captured by changes in R&D expenditure and is consistent with Swift (2008).
Table 1 describes the dependent and independent variables used in the study.
3.1. Model estimation
This study employs OLS Pooled regression model as a basic model and compares the findings to 
alternative approaches i.e. fixed effects and difference-in-difference model (DiD). To address the 
concern that corporate governance variables, performance and R&D volatility are jointly determined 
by unobservable firm-specific variables, the study employs a fixed effects model and random effects 
Table 1. Describing the dependent, independent and control variables used in the study
Determinants Operationalisation
Dependent: Firm performance variable
Tobin’s Q ratio (TQ) Tobin’s Q ratio is the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of total debt divided by the book 
value of total assets
Return on assets (ROA) ROA is expressed as the net income divided by total assets
Independent: Corporate governance variables
Gender diversity (Female) The proportion of female directors on the board
Board independence (NED) The ratio of non-executive and/or independent directors to total number of directors on the board
Duality Duality is a dummy variable which equals to zero if CEO and chairman of the company taken by separate 
person, and equals to one otherwise
Board size Board size is the natural logarithm of board size. Board size is the total number of directors on the board
Independent: Performance variables
Earnings risk Standard deviation of net income
R&D intensity R&D intensity is the ratio of research and development expenditure to total assets
R&D volatility R&D volatility is measured using a coefficient of variation (Standard deviation of R&D expenditure/ Mean of 
R&D expenditure)
R&D expenditure changes
•  Decrease R&D
•  Increase R&D
R&D expenditure changes are shown as dummy variables and are expressed as: Decrease R&D and Increase 
R&D
Sales to total assets (STA) STA is expressed as sales divided by total assets 
Sales growth Sales growth is expressed as difference between the current year sales minus previous year sales divided by 
previous year sales
Control variables
Firm age The natural logarithm of firm age (lnfage) is used in the models. Firm age is the number of years from the 
time that the company incorporated
Firm size The natural logarithm of firm size (lnfsize) is used in the models. Firm size is the book value of total assets
Leverage Leverage is the percentage of the book value of long-term debt to the book value of total assets
Page 7 of 16
Duppati et al., Cogent Economics & Finance (2017), 5: 1317117
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2017.1317117
regression model, which represents a common method of controlling for omitted variables in a 
panel data-set (Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012; Yermack, 1996). The fixed effect model explains the 
variations about the mean of the dependent variable in terms of variations about the means of 
explanatory variable for a group of observations relating to a given firm. The main interest for using 
this model is that it controls for heterogeneity bias. This model assumes spatial dimension and is 
expressed as follows:
The basic specification with controlling firm characteristics is expressed as below:
where Yt is dependent variable and two proxies are used as performance variables: Tobin’s Q (TQ) 
and return on assets (ROA).
X1it is a vector of independent variables including board and firm characteristics (leverage, gender 
diversity, NED, board size, firm age, firm size (total assets), R&D expenditure changes, R&D volatility, 
R&D intensity and X2it is a vector for dummy variable which is 1 for Duality and 0 for non-Duality. The 
description of variables is shown in Table 1 before reference list. In an attempt to alleviate the po-
tential bias caused by omitted variables, we control for other general firm characteristics including 
firm age, firm size and leverage.
The baseline model in this study is as follows:
It is important to identify the suitable empirical model for the study. Towards this the study per-
forms diagnostics tests that include: Hausman tests (to decide between the fixed and random ef-
fects) and Breusch–Pagan Lagrange multiplier tests (to decide between pooled and random 
regression model).
3.2. Robustness check: Difference-in-difference model
Besides using a multivariate OLS regression with fixed effects, this paper also uses DiD model analy-
sis in measuring the linkages between R&D, Board Independence (non-executive directors) and firm 
performance using a sample of Irish and Spanish firms. This empirical model is appropriate in iden-
tifying the effects of a specific intervention as exogenous shock, in this case, the financial crisis pe-
riod of 2008–2010. The effects of board characteristics and R&D on performance will be examined 
during the crisis period by comparing the outcomes after and before the intervention for groups af-
fected by the intervention to the same difference for the unaffected groups (Bertrand, Duo, & 
Mullainathan, 2003).
Treatment and control groups. This paper considers financial crisis as an exogenous shock on 
firms. Thereafter, a treatment and a control group can be assigned among the Spanish- and Irish-
listed firms. The firms whose R&D expenditure is below the mean are considered as treatment group 
and those which are above the mean are referred as control group. Using ROA and Tobin’s Q as the 
main dependent variable to measure firm performance, the DID model specification is expressed 
below:
(1)
Y
t
= ∝ +훽1Femalet + 훽2NEDt + 훽3Dualityt + 훽4BSizet + 훿1FAget + 훿2firm sizet + 훿3Leveraget
+ 훿4DecreaseR&Dt + 훽8IncreaseR&Dt + 훽9R&DIntensityt + 훽10R&DVolatilityt
+ 훽11Earnings riskt + 휀t
(2)
Tobin
�
sQ
it
= ∝ +훽1Femaleit + 훽2NEDit + 훽3Dualityit + 훽4Board sizeit + 훽5Firm sizeit + 훽6Leverageit
+ 훽7DecreaseR&Dit + 훽8IncreaseR&Dit + 훽9R&DIntensityit + 훽10R&DVolatilityit
+ 훽11Earnings riskit + 휀it
(3)
ROA
it
= ∝ +훽1Femaleit + 훽2NEDit + 훽3Dualityit + 훽4Board sizeit + 훽5Firm sizeit + 훽6Leverageit
+ 훽7DecreaseR&Dit + 훽8IncreaseR&Dit + 훽9R&DIntensityit + 훽10R&DVolatilityit
+ 훽11Earnings riskit + 휀it
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The coefficient of interest, i.e. β3 will be the DiD estimate:
4. Empirical findings
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 shows that the boards in Ireland are mostly comprised of independent directors. The repre-
sentation of the independent or NED is seven for a board size of 10.66 and fourteen if the board size 
is 23. While the representation of female board members are 0.85 and 1.84 on the boards with a 
mean size of 10.66 and on the boards with a maximum size of 23. With regards to duality, it is evi-
dent from the Table 2 that out of the total 21 companies considered in the study, six companies have 
the chairman as chief executive officer (CEO) while the rest consider the roles of the chairman and 
CEO as separate.
In the case of Spain, Table 3 shows that the representation of the NED is 9 and 20.54, respectively, 
for the boards with a mean size of 11.57 and for the boards with a maximum size of 26. While, the 
female board members are 0.92 and 2.08 on the boards with a mean size of 11.57 and a maximum 
size of 26. With regards to duality, out of the total 52 companies, 28 companies do not separate the 
role of the chairman from that of the CEO, while the remaining 24 companies have the roles of the 
chairman and CEO separated.
(4)ROAit = 훽0 + 훽1Treatmenti + 훽2Postt + 훽3Treatmenti × Postt + 휇i,t
(5)훽
3
(
ΔROA
Treated
)
−
(
ΔROA
Control
)
Table 2. Summary statistics of the Irish-listed companies (210 observations)
Variable Mean SD Min Max
ROA 6.07 9.73 −40.10 36.81
TQ 1.19 1.14 0.04 6.13
Female 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.33
NED 0.63 0.15 0.30 1.00
Duality 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
Board size 10.66 3.83 5.00 23.00
Firm size 6.65 2.01 1.52 10.02
Leverage 23.59 19.08 0.00 114.45
STA 1.16 0.97 0.05 10.36
Table 3. Summary statistics of the Spanish-listed companies (520 observations)
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Female 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.50
NED 0.79 0.16 0.00 1.00
Duality 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00
Board size 11.57 3.47 4.00 26.00
Firm size 6.94 2.05 1.68 11.94
ROA 4.29 7.19 −26.13 36.21
TQ 0.79 0.88 0.03 5.98
Leverage 0.34 0.22 0.00 2.35
STA 0.68 0.40 0.02 4.06
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It is evident from the Table 4 that, in the case of Spanish-listed firms, the female representation 
on the boards affect performance negatively and significantly at 1% level when ROA is used as a 
performance measure. While the effects of NED on performance is not significant with the exception 
of TQ measure under fixed effects model which is significant at 5% level and doesn’t support the 
proposition stated in the study (refer to Hypothesis 5).
Duality is negative and insignificant across three specification models with the exception of TQ-
OLS. This doesn’t support the proposition stated in the study (refer to Hypothesis 2) suggesting a 
positive association between duality and performance during non-crisis periods. The effect of board 
size on performance is negative and significant at 1% level in general and does not support the hy-
pothesis stated in the study (Hypothesis 1).
The firm size has a positive relationship with firm performance at 1% level of significance and 
leverage has a significant and negative relationship across the four model specifications. The in-
crease and decrease in the R&D expenditure show a positive and significant relationship with the 
Table 4. Effects of R&D Volatility and corporate governance on performance of Spanish-listed 
firms for the period 2005–2014
**Significance at 5% level.
***Significance at 1% level (t-values in parentheses).
  ROA-OLS ROA-FE TQ-OLS TQ-FE
Female −12.08 −17.73 −0.31 0.396
(4.29)*** (4.52)*** 0.87 1.04
Non-executive directors −0.507 −0.695 0.294 0.509
0.27 0.3 1.35 (2.28)**
Duality −461 −0.432 −0.151 −0.124
0.73 0.55 (2.06)** 1.65
Board size −0.423 −0.494 −0.113 −0.089
(3.43)*** (2.51)** (6.99)*** (4.49)***
Firm size 2.665 3.536 0.328 0.524
(11.60)*** (8.31)*** (10.58)*** (12.73)***
Leverage −11.89 −11.73 −0.855 −0.582
(9.29)*** (8.10)*** (6.14)*** (-4.15)***
Decrease R&D 2.317 2.439 0.641 0.533
1.24 1.3 (3.37)*** (2.94)***
Increase R&D 2.234 2.039 0.613 0.444
1.21 1.09 (3.25)*** (2.46)**
R&D intensity −2.437 −1.477 −0.314 0.386
1.52 0.58 −1.48 1.57
R&D volatility −1.925 −0.445 0.111 0.202
(1.80)** 0.39 0.98 (1.82)
Earnings risk −0.001 −0.001 0 0.001
(2.08)** 0.48 0.78 0.69
_cons −3.516 −9.751 −0.62 −2.751
1.22 (2.05)** (1.72) (5.97)***
N 520 520 520 520
R2 0.42 0.38 0.26 0.09
Wald χ2(10)/F(10, 179) 296.32 22.4 229.6 24.96
Pro > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Tobin’s Q at 1% level. This suggests that the boards are effectively monitoring the allocation of funds 
to those channels that adds value by replacing those that are outdated and supports the study hy-
pothesis (7th). While R&D intensity and volatility and earnings risk have insignificant effects with the 
exception of ROA-OLS specification.
It is evident from the Table 5 that, in the case of Ireland, the female representation on the boards 
affects performance negatively and significantly at 5% level. While the effects of NED on perfor-
mance is negative and significant at 1% level for ROA measure and 5% level for TQ measure and 
doesn’t support the proposition stated in the study (refer to Hypothesis 3). Duality is insignificant 
across the four model specifications. This doesn’t support the proposition stated in the study (refer 
to Hypothesis 2) suggesting a positive association between duality and performance during non-
crisis periods.
The effect of board size on performance is negative and significant at 5% level for TQ performance 
proxy does not support the hypothesis stated in the study (Hypothesis 1). The firm size is positive at 
Table 5. Effects of R&D volatility and corporate governance on performance of Irish-listed 
firms for the period 2005–2014
*Significance at 10% level.
**Significance at 5% level.
***Significance at 1% level (t-values in parentheses).
ROA-OLS ROA-FE TQ-OLS TQ-FE
Female −15.57 −20.313 −2.042 −1.672
1.58 (1.96)** (2.18)** (1.77)*
Non-executive directors −15.36 −19.136 −1.244 −1.089
(2.80)*** (2.80)*** (2.16)** (1.74)*
Duality 0.951 0.772 −0.016 0.027
0.54 0.36 0.09 0.14
Board size 0.038 −0.233 −0.06 −0.065
0.15 −0.75 (2.28)** (-2.30)**
Firm size 3.053 4.48 0.442 0.556
(5.12)*** (5.52)*** (6.81)*** (7.48)***
Leverage −0.212 −0.187 −0.015 −0.013
(5.66)*** (-4.04)*** (-4.10)*** (3.11)***
Decrease R&D 0.069 0.09 −0.011 −0.062
0.03 0.47 0.06 0.33
Increase R&D 1.132 0.905 0.102 0.22
0.58 0.47 0.57 0.13
R&D intensity 2.605 4.432 −0.746 −0.65
0.68 0.99 (1.93)* 1.58
R&D volatility 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.12 0.89 0.33 0.98
Earnings risk 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.100 0.58 −0.48 0.03
_cons −0.35 −3.357 0.307 −0.618
0.06 0.62 0.44 −0.78
N 210 210 210 210
R2 0.27 0.22 0.15 0.1
Wald χ2(10)/F(10, 179) 96 9.29 107.69 10.77
Pro > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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1% level of significance and leverage is significant and negative across the four model specifications. 
The increase and decrease in the R&D expenditure, R&D intensity and R&D volatility and earnings risk 
have insignificant effects on the performance of Irish-listed firms and do not favour the study 
hypothesis (refer to Hypothesis 7).
Regarding results presented in Table 6, the corporate governance variables are mostly insignifi-
cant in driving performance during the crisis period. In the case of Ireland, duality has a significant 
and negative influence on the performance during the crisis and supports the views of Finkelstein 
and D’Aveni (1994) and Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) who state that powerful CEOs, for example, 
those with dual role, tend to have a beneficial effect on firm performance in uncertain environments. 
Our results support that CEO duality allows a single unified voice to guide a firm during a crisis. The 
effects of NED on the performance are negative and suggest outside directors have information 
disadvantage in reacting quickly during the time of crisis and hence, affect the performance nega-
tively (van Essen, Engelen, & Carney, 2013; Williamson, 2007). The findings do not support the hy-
potheses proposed in the study with regards to the association between board size, NED and duality 
with the firms’ performance (Hypothesis 1, 3 and 5).
Table 6. Performance (Tobin’s Q) of Spanish- and Irish-listed companies during the Financial 
crisis for the period 2008–2010
*Significance at 10% level.
**Significance at 5% level.
***Significance at 1% level (t-values in parentheses).
Spain Ireland
Variables Quantile regression Regression Quantile regression Regression 
Female 0.094 −0.195 −1.345 −1.167
−0.31 −0.48 −1.7 −0.83
Non-executive directors 0.06 −0.116 −0.028 −0.27
−0.37 −0.54 −0.07 −0.39
Board-duality −0.03 −0.023 −0.328 −0.598
−0.52 −0.3 (2.76)*** (2.83)***
Board size −0.022 −0.037 −0.012 −0.003
(1.92)* (2.53)** −0.69 −0.11
Firm age −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.003
(1.96)* −1.34 −1.66 −1.63
Leverage −0.897 −1.178 −0.014 −0.019
(4.42)*** (4.46)*** (4.88)*** (3.75)***
Expenses efficiency −1.175 −0.97 −0.083 −0.119
(5.05)*** (3.20)*** (2.93)*** (2.38)**
Firm size 0.084 0.186 0.103 0.118
(3.46)*** (5.89)*** (2.57)** −1.65
Sales growth −1.604 −1.312 −0.816 0.546
(2.95)*** (-1.85)* −1.37 −0.52
Sales to total assets 0.387 0.385 −0.247 −0.426
(4.20)*** (3.21)*** (3.06)*** (2.98)***
Research & development 0.0034 0.0065 0.0098 0.0010
(2.15)** (3.98)*** (2.61)** (2.87)***
Constant 1.389 1.055 1.246 1.945
(4.80)*** (2.80)*** (3.94)*** (3.47)***
N 156 156 63 63
R2 0.5 0.48
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The Table 7 reports the regression results for the DiD model, as stated in Section 3.2, the variable 
of interest is the interaction variable i.e. R&D expenditure variable and financial crisis period, 
Treatment × Post. It is evident from Table 7 that the co-efficient of interaction variable in the case of 
Irish firms is insignificant while the Spanish results suggest a positive and significant association 
between the interaction variable and performance for the ROA-OLS model specification and the co-
efficient is 2.309 with the t-statistics value of 2.43% which is significant at 5% level of significance. 
This suggests that the R&D expenditure has relevance to the Spanish-listed firms’ performance dur-
ing the financial crisis period. The results support the creative–destructive (restructuring) view of the 
incessant product and process innovation mechanism in which new production units replace out-
dated ones (Schumpeter, 1942) and deals effectively with R&D expenditure towards value creation.
Table 8 reports the regression results for the DiD model, as stated in Section 3.2, the variable of 
interest is the interaction variable i.e. Treatment × Post. It is evident from Table 8 that the co-effi-
cient of interaction variable in the case of Irish and Spanish firms is insignificant across all the four 
model specifications. This suggests that the NEDs have less relevance to the performance of the 
Spanish- and Irish-listed firms during the financial crisis period. The results support do not favour the 
perspective of the resource dependence theory which takes a positive view and underscores the 
importance of NED on boards as a resource in helping the firm secure access to diverse resources in 
Table 7. Effects of R&D on performance during the financial crisis period of 2008–2010 using 
difference in difference regression model
*Significance at 5% level.
**Significance at 1% level (t-values in parentheses).
Spain Ireland
ROA TQ ROA TQ
Treat −1.119 −0.27 −1.96 −0.539
−1.61 (2.96)** −1.13 (2.74)**
Post −3.552 −0.519 −0.413 −1.294
(4.61)** (5.14)** −0.21 (5.79)**
Treat * post 2.309 0.177 1.263 0.348
(2.43)** −1.42 −0.52 −1.27
Firm size 1.977 0.203 1.18 0.255
(11.73)** (9.20)** (2.38)* (4.56)**
Leverage −10.394 −1.223 −0.212 −0.012
(9.52)** (8.55)** (5.70)** (2.93)**
Duality −0.327 −0.059 −0.209 −0.544
−0.7 −0.96 −0.15 (3.53)**
Board size −0.022 −0.033 0.217 0.015
−0.25 (2.83)** −1.21 −0.75
Sales to assets 3.464 0.636 1.689 −0.003
(5.52)** (7.74)** (2.73)** −0.04
Efficiency ratio −17.177 −1.552 −0.881 0.004
(9.68)** (6.68)** (2.64)** −0.1
Sales growth 7.212 −0.264 11.395 1.683
−1.91 −0.53 −1.13 −1.48
_cons 9.283 1.483 0.676 0.529
(4.22)** (5.15)** −0.18 −1.23
R2 0.54 0.46 0.36 0.4
N 520 520 210 210
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which they can add value to the firm’s performance by using their networks and outside connections 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and, views governance structure and the board composition as a resource 
that can add value to the firm (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001).
5. Conclusions
This study investigates the linkages between R&D, Board characteristics and firm performance using 
a sample of Irish and Spanish firms during the period 2005–2014. The study includes 21 companies 
listed on Ireland stock exchange Index, ISEQ20 and 52 major companies in Spain stock market, in-
cluding all the companies listed on index IBEX35, for the period 2005–2014.
The results suggest a comparability of boards’ independence for the Spanish- and Irish-listed firms. 
Likewise, three-fourth (3/4) of the sample size considered in the study have duality in which the role 
of chairman (governance) and CEO (management) are separated. The female representation in 
Ireland case is comparable to Spain, in which quota for female representation is in practice through 
the codes. However, the Spanish firms are less dual i.e. nearly 54% of the boards do not separate the 
roles of the chairman and CEO and therefore, differ from Irish firms in the case of duality.
The results suggest that NED affect performance of the Irish-listed firms significantly and nega-
tively while they are insignificant in the case of Spanish firms. Moreover, the term independence 
doesn’t merely, ensure independence to the NED. This could be because of the different institutional 
Table 8. Effects of NEDs on performance during the financial crisis period of 2008–2010 using 
difference in difference regression model
*Significance at 5% level.
**Significance at 1% level (t-values in parentheses).
Spain Ireland
ROA TQ ROA TQ
Treat 0.48 −0.182 −2.914 −0.347
−0.54 −1.53 −1.61 −1.56
Post −0.493 −0.055 0.084 0.131
−0.81 −0.68 −0.06 −0.74
Treat * post −0.737 −0.033 3.012 −0.167
−0.7 −0.23 −1.23 −0.56
Firm size 1.519 0.1 1.295 0.028
(12.66)** (6.20)** (3.80)** −0.68
Leverage −11.675 −1.521 −0.198 −0.022
(11.05)** (10.76)** (6.15)** (5.70)**
Duality −0.237 −0.004 0.043 −0.696
−0.51 −0.07 −0.03 (4.23)**
Sales to assets 4.197 0.806 1.826 −0.007
(6.92)** (9.94)** (2.98)** −0.09
Efficiency ratio −18.087 −1.783 −0.939 −0.046
(10.06)** (7.41)** (2.73)** −1.09
Sales growth 9.988 0.162 11.222 1.684
(2.62)** −0.32 −1.1 −1.35
_cons 11.499 1.772 1.476 1.863
(5.50)** (6.33)** −0.48 (4.90)**
R2 0.52 0.42 0.36 0.3
N 520 520 210 210
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expectations regarding their boards’ composition and this institutional context may lead to a differ-
ent relationship with firm performance (Judge, Naoumova, & Koutzevol, 2003). This can be substan-
tiated with the findings of Clifford and Evans (1997) which shows that in spite of the Australian 
boards being composed of a majority of NED, 35% of those NED were involved with financial transac-
tions which potentially threaten their independence.
Further, during the financial crisis, the NED have negative and insignificant effects on the perfor-
mance in the cases of the Spanish firms and Irish firms. The results are robust to alternate model 
specifications that include difference in difference model, Quantile regression model and OLS re-
gression models. These findings are consistent with the literature that suggests information disad-
vantage to NED compared with insiders, hence, are typically slow to react in situations of adversity 
and have negative effects for a firm’s financial performance (van Essen et al., 2013; Williamson, 
2007).
Although the Spanish firms are less dual than Irish firms, the results suggest a comparable asso-
ciation between duality and firm performance. With regards to duality, the results of the Spanish 
firms suggest a negative association with performance (TQ-OLS model) for Spanish firms. The find-
ings do not favour the agency argument that separating the roles of CEO and chairman of the board 
can mitigate agency costs (Chen et al., 2005; Jermias, 2007).
During the financial crisis period, the association between duality and firm performance for the 
Irish firms are negative and significant. There is a variation in the degree of magnitude in which they 
affect the firm performance. However, these findings do not support the view that powerful CEOs, i.e. 
those with dual role, tend to have a beneficial effect on firm performance in uncertain environments 
where, encumbered by fewer constraints, they can make quick decisions without the need to build 
consensus. In these contexts, CEO duality allows a single unified voice to guide a firm during a crisis 
as there is little ambiguity regarding who is incharge (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994; Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1990).
With regards to the female representation, Spain and Ireland are negative and significantly as-
sociated with firms’ financial performance in two of the four model specifications. The results are 
comparable in the case of the two countries regardless of the quota system on gender equality in 
Spain and no quota or law in Ireland to support gender balance.
The effects of board size on performance are significant and negative for Spanish firms and Irish 
(for two model specifications) firms. This is consistent with the literature (Conyon & Peck, 1998; 
Loderer & Peyer, 2002). Nonetheless, it is in contrast with the theoretical (agency and resource 
dependency) that suggests a positive association between the board size and performance (Barroso 
Castro et al., 2010). The agency supports any mechanisms that solve the conflict between managers 
and owners (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Given that the board of 
directors is seen as a good tool to align their respective competing interests, and exercise better 
control on managers than those with smaller number (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; 
Freeman, 1984). Meanwhile, the effects of firm size while leverage and R&D have negative association 
for both countries.
The findings of Spanish-listed firms show a positive and significant relationship between increase 
and decrease in the R&D expenditures volatility and performance and support the creative–destruc-
tive perspective suggested in the study. Creative–destructive (restructuring) perspective suggests 
that fluctuations in R&D occur due to effective governance in funding allocation to R&D. Further, the 
results obtained from using DiD model during the financial crisis suggests that the R&D expenditure 
has relevance to the Spanish-listed firms’ performance during the financial crisis period. The evi-
dence supports the creative–destructive (restructuring) view of the incessant product and process 
innovation mechanism in which new production units replace outdated ones (Schumpeter, 1942) 
and deals effectively with R&D expenditure towards value creation.
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It can be concluded that in general, there is no significant difference between the Irish and Spanish 
boards in influencing performance although they vary in their codes on corporate governance relat-
ing to gender diversity, board size and board composition relating to NED.
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